This article seeks to quash three myths prevalent in Kashmiri literature. They are three distinct categories of misperception, but they are best addressed here before the concluding sections inform the reader of India’s catastrophic events (notably the abolishment of Article 370) and articulate a final message of reconciliation and peace.
On Kashmiriyat:
The claim of a supposedly united and secular for two reasons, the assertion of a supposedly unified and secular Kashmiriyat offers a frighteningly reductionist perspective. First, it is a politically engineered term that was created and inserted by an occupation force, but it has no staying power. Second, Kashmiris were acutely aware of global events such as the dissolution of pan-Islamic polities and class violence with clear religious overtones.
Kashmiriyat arose from India’s desire to define itself as a secular nation while also justifying its military presence in Kashmir. Similarly, the pioneering Indian Anthropologist T. N. Madan, himself a Kashmiri Pandit, wrote on the emergence of the term Kashmiriyat: “the first thing to emphasize is that Kashmiriyat is not a Kashmiri word.” As a result, it cannot be claimed to be a native category of perception. It is a clone of Punjabiyat that was created artificially and was coined no earlier than the 1980s.” As one Indian scholar put it, this so-called Kashmiriyat is “an empty signifier.”
On Sufism:
Many scholars mischaracterize Pakistan as an allegedly Deobandi-Salafi-dominated country, in contrast to Kashmiri Muslims, who practice a Sufi brand of Islam. This misconception is incorrect on two counts: first, Sufism has widespread and mainstream appeal throughout Pakistan, and second, Salafist political Islam is a much more recent and marginal movement that represents the aftershocks of the Saudi-Iran rivalry.
Despite the fact that Pakistan faced an extremely difficult situation during and after the 1980s, with the influx of extremism and the exogenously promoted sectarian divide attempting to vandalize Sufi ideology. However, in modern Pakistan, Sufism has evolved into a full-fledged social movement with representation in the arts, the press, and religious practice, including the visitation and veneration of Sufi saints in all of Pakistan’s provinces. In contrast, the electoral results of Pakistan’s democratic practice demonstrate a general dislike for extremist or ultraorthodox interpretations of Islam, which is why parties like Jammat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Tehreek-e-Labaik (TLP) rarely, if ever, gain even 5% of seats in any national election.
On the other hand, local politicians regularly seek the support of the Gaddi Nashin (descendants of the Sufi Saint). Sufism is thus not a Kashmir-centric phenomenon, nor does it differentiate Kashmiris from their brethren in Pakistan.
On Gilgit-Baltistan:
The territory of GB has a distinct history from that of Kashmir, and this must be emphasized emphatically at this juncture, given the current government’s increasingly irredentist claims in New Delhi. As per Yaqoob Bangash, GB was historically a fully autonomous governed territory that was only subject to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir on a limited basis. During the colonial period, it was leased to the British until 1947. However, the British betrayed their promise to the people of Gilgit, and the entire Gilgit agency was handed over to the maharaja under the 3 January 1947 plan. Brig Ghansara Singh took over as Governor of Gilgit on August 1, 1947.
The people of the Gilgit Agency, on the other hand, never accepted Ghansara Singh’s authority. Major William Brown, the Maharaja’s commander of the Gilgit Scouts, mutinied and overthrew Governor Singh on November 1, 1947, sensing their discontent. The agency’s personnel declared Gilgit to be a part of Pakistan and raised the Pakistani flag.
Khan Muhammad Alam Khan, a Pakistani political agent, arrived in Gilgit on November 16 to assume responsibility for the region. Baltistan was also a part of the Gilgit agency. As a result, GB has a distinct history and political dynamics from the rest of the erstwhile J&K state, and attempts by revisionists and irredentists to conflate its history with the J&K only serve to blur historical context. Nehru anticipated that no plebiscite would be required in GB (then Northern Areas) because its people had already decided in favour of Pakistan during the Dixon Plan negotiations.
- 1965 War: When Pak Turned from a Country into A Nation - 07/09/2022
- Debunking Three Myths of Kashmir Conflict - 19/08/2022
