The Lahore Resolution in March 1940 spoke about states in North Western India and South East of India, meaning thereby that there could be more than one Muslim majority state once the principle of partition was adopted. However, In the General Elections 1945-46, Muslim League proved that that was the only representative party of Muslims. Quaid-i-Azam called the Convention of all elected Muslim League members of the provincial and central legislatures at Delhi on April 19th 1946. The cardinal resolution of the convention was presented by Hussain Shaheed Suhrwardi. It stated that “The zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North East and the Punjab, N.W.F.P, Sindh and Baluchistan be constituted into a sovereign independent state. Thus the Muslim League’s demand of “separate states” for Indian Muslims in its Lahore Resolution 1940 was amended by using the word “separate state”.
After the Hindu-Muslim riots in the wake of the Direct Action of Muslim League on August 16, 1946, resulted in huge loss of life and property in Calcutta, Noakhali and Bihar, there was serious debate about the possibility of a United Bengal, separated from Pakistan or the Indian Union to avoid large scale uprooting of the population as well as to preserve the Bengali culture, heritage and language spanned over more than 1300 years.
United Bengal was a proposal to transform Bengal Province into an undivided, sovereign state at the time of the Partition of India. It sought to prevent the division of Bengal on religious grounds and institute a confessionalist political system i.e. permanent distribution of key public offices to designated communities. The objective was to ensure the peaceful co-existence of diverse religious and ethnic communities by empowering each according to its “weight” in the region.
On 27 April 1947, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy outlined his opposition to the looming partition of Bengal at a press conference in New Delhi. Suhrawardy made a passionate case for setting aside religious differences to create an “independent, undivided, and sovereign Bengal”. He enjoyed the support of some important Hindu as well as Muslim leaders from Bengal. For a while, Mahatma Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah were also open to the idea of an independent Bengal.
However, the Congress Party backtracked as Nehru formally stated on 27 May 1947, that his party would “agree to Bengal remaining united only if it remains in the Indian Union”. Congress President Kripalani stated “All that the Congress seeks to do today is to rescue as many areas as possible from the threatened domination of the League and Pakistan. It wants to save as much territory for a Free Indian Union as is possible… It therefore insists upon the division of Bengal and Punjab…
On 20 June 1947, the Bengal Legislative Assembly met to vote on the partition of Bengal. However the legislators from West and east Bengal couldn’t arrive at a consensus. No vote on the United Bengal proposal was held and the partition of Bengal went ahead according to the Mountbatten Plan. It created a state of Pakistan whose two parts were located at a distance of 2204 Kilometers (1370 Miles) and separated by an understandably hostile country. Territorial contiguity had been a cardinal principle of nation building since the days of Hapsburg Empire. However, the singularly unique features of the new state were not just confined to spatial distance. Culturally Speaking, North-Western half of Pakistan was Iranic and more akin to central Asian antecedents while the south-eastern half (East Pakistan) carried Indic fiber.
One important factor related to the evolution of political culture in both parts of Pakistan. The British colonizers had entered India from its eastern ports as against earlier invaders who came through the mountainous routes of North Western India. The British dominance over Bengal was complete in War of Plessey (1757) while the British attained total control over Delhi after 1857 mutiny. Sindh and Punjab fell to the British rule in 1843 and 1849 respectively. The British efforts to consolidate their power in Baluchistan and farther frontiers in the West continued during the second part of the 19th century. Calcutta remained the capital of the British India till 1912. The political and administrative seat of the government went a long way to the academic progress as well as political consciousness of the Bengali people who already enjoyed a rich cultural heritage and arguably the most sophisticated linguistic tradition in India. The fact that the Bengalis enjoyed better literacy rate than their counterparts in The West Pakistan can be gauged by the fact that 1971, the literacy rate in West Pakistan was 21.70% as against 47% in East Pakistan. The land-holding pattern of small cultivable tracts in East Bengal was distinctly different from West Pakistan where a miniscule landed aristocracy held large estates while the majority was landless. East Pakistan implemented land reforms in 1950 while several lackluster steps in this direction failed to succeed in West Pakistan.
The language question was not just confined to presumed superiority or access to jobs but in several different ways as well. Bengali (with minor variations of dialects) was spoken and understood across the whole of Bengal, turning it into a single language community. On the other hand, West Pakistan comprised of four different federal units with their own languages, hardly understood beyond their own frontiers. While hardly any person knew Bengali in West Pakistan, the Bengalis were completely alien to languages spoken in West Pakistan. Further, different parts of the West Pakistan who had joined the state of Pakistan as federal units differed in terms of area, population, topography, climatic condition, cultural heritage and historical traditions. To further complicate the situation was the fact that nearly 75% of the military was recruited from arid plateau of Potohar in North Punjab. It is important to point out that while Pakistan received only 17.5 percent of the assets and liabilities of British India, it inherited nearly 32% of the British Indian army. Indian army stood at 260000 in 1947 while Pakistan got 140000 soldiers and officers. Such a large army, trained and molded in the colonial cast was bound to create complications in a region where literacy rate was hardly 13.8 % and the country lacked industrial and commercial infrastructure. Another important demographic complication emerged from the fact that out of the five federal units, East Bengal alone constituted 55.6 % of population as against collective population of four West Pakistan provinces counting for 44.4 % of the population. While the political power lay in the West Pakistan, the majority of the population in eastern wing felt deprived of their due share in decision making. During the first two decades, the economic disparity between both wings increased astronomically. During 1947-1960, 62 % of the foreign aid was allocated to West Pakistan, 17 % to East Pakistan, and 21 per cent was reserved for the federal expenditure. Similarly, during the period 1947 to I960, the central and provincial development expenditure in East Pakistan was roughly 24 per cent of the total, and on an average 75 per cent of the total investments of semi-autonomous bodies was located in West Pakistan. Add to this disparity the fact, that the biggest national export was jute, produced in East Pakistan and the largest expenditure, roughly 60 % of the federal budget was defense, which was centered in West Pakistan. The trade paradigm of licenses, permits, foreign exchange rate control clearly demonstrated that the resources of the East Pakistan were transferred to West Pakistan, resulting in poor growth rate of economy in Eastern wing and lower purchasing capacity.
Bengal had traditionally been more tolerant in terms of religious inclusion while West Pakistan leaned towards religious exclusivity. In 1951, the non-Muslim population in West Pakistan was 3.44 per cent, while in East Pakistan the non-Muslim comprised 23.20 per cent of the population. An Indirect result of demographic disparity in terms of religious diversity, the law-makers in West Pakistan preferred separate electorate while the political leadership of East Pakistan could not afford to lose such a large vote bank. Even so, the resignation letter sent by Jogindera Nath Mandal, Federal Law minister, to the then Prime Minister Liaqat Ali khan in October 1950 is a scathing indictment of the treatment meted out to religious minorities in East Pakistan. The cultural fabric of East Pakistan was more vibrant with music, dance and painting being part of everyday life while West Pakistan elite wanted to impose a puritanical way of life in the name of a single national culture under the garb of religious injunctions, as interpreted by religious clergy.
In this respect, it is pertinent to recall the ominous incident of Cable 71 which turned out to be prophetic. Cable 1971, also known as Priority Signal, was a secret military signal dispatched in December 1952 between Pakistan Army and Pakistan Navy. It essentially predicted the break-up of Pakistan. By sheer coincidence, the title of the file contained the digit 71, the year when the separation actually took place. The cable discussed the implication of One Unit and one culture policy, religious fanaticism, and the economic disparity between the West and East Pakistan. Two points in this cable deserve to be quoted verbatim:
- The creation of Committee of Ulema to veto the decisions taken in the House of People on religious matters, gives excess of powers to Ulema over the rights of elected representatives of the people. This gives an impression of Pakistan as being a theocratic state.
- To recommend that the head of the state should be a Muslim will unnecessarily create suspicions in minds of the minorities in Pakistan. The choice to select the head of the state should be left entirely to the people, to select without prejudice to caste, color and creed.
Even the geographic conditions in both parts of the country were quite dissimilar. While West Pakistan had a range of topographic as well as climatic conditions, East Pakistan was mostly an alluvial region with countless rivers and their tributaries. It inevitably affected flora, fauna and cuisine of both parts. The geographic conditions also reflected in physical feature of the people of East Pakistan who were generally short in height and of darker complexion. Oblivious to the delicacy of the bond between two parts of the same country, Bengalis were subjected to racial slur in public spaces as well as official circles.
Bengal was the first region in Colonial India where the voices for freedom began to rise as early as late 19th century. In fact, the first partition of Bengal in 1905 was triggered out of fear that the educated Bengalis in such huge numbers might create problems for the British administration. It was in the academic institutions of Bengal that the national freedom movement acquired her distinct features. Decades later, the West Pakistani officialdom, elite and conservative political elements would blame Bengali teachers, intellectuals and students to fan the embers of discontent among the masses. On the other hand, Politics in West Pakistan generally revolved around landed aristocracy, wealth and shenanigans of personal influence.
The question of official language of Pakistan was one of initial political conflict that emerged in Pakistan. Quaid e Azam accepted the demand of the erstwhile Muslim minority provinces like CP, UP and Bihar and favored Urdu for the official language of Pakistan. It didn’t please the speakers of the local languages of West Pakistan but with East Bengal the situation grew critical. The Bengalis constituted an overall majority in the total population of Pakistan. Their language, Bengali had a different script from Urdu and much older tradition. Jinnah visited East Pakistan in March, 1948 where he announced that, “Urdu aloe will be the state language of Pakistan. The Bengali audience in the gathering protested vociferously. For Bengalis, the imposition of Urdu would have damaged their chances for government jobs.
On February 21, 1952, students organized a demonstration in Dhaka and demanded equal status for Bengali. The police opened fire and killed several students. Two years later, the National Assembly agreed to designate “Urdu and Bengali to be the official languages of Pakistan”.
First Legislative elections in East Bengal were held in March 1954. The opposition United Front led by the Awami League and Krishak Sramik Party won a landslide victory with 223 of the 309 seats. The ruling Muslim League could not even win enough seats to form a parliamentary group on its own. The Chief Minister and all his ministers lost their seats. The electoral outcome should have been an eye-opener but was not to be.
West Pakistan political leadership was afraid of not just the numerical superiority of the East Pakistan but also the political potential of a vibrant opposition which could disrupt the undemocratic and unjust power equilibrium imposed upon the country. Several plans were hatched but the one forwarded by Ayub Khan found favor with Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and his coterie. This Plan envisaged the merger of all provinces, states and territories of West Pakistan into one administrative unit and declare its weightage equal to that of East Bengal. The idea was floated by Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra in November 1954 and promulgated on 13th September 1955. However one Unit scheme was doomed to begin with. The provinces in West Pakistan were displeased that they had been deprived of their identity. On the other hand, Bengalis were extremely unhappy that there numerical superiority had been obliterated. The self-proclaimed ruling clique had pretended to inculcate national unity by obfuscating cultural, ethnic and historical identities. The outcome was quite the opposite. Political Leaders and the masses in both parts of the country felt deeply aggrieved that the goal of a democratic polity was disappearing in the dust of conspiracies.
In fact, all these schemes were the handiwork of two persons, Sikandar Mirza and Ayub Khan. With their military background, they deeply mistrusted democracy and hated politicians. In the larger contest of cold war, both men believed that they could strike a deal with the capitalist bloc and rule the country while serving the interests of the Western bloc. Finally Sikandar Mirza abrogated 1956 constitution which he himself had signed. Martial law was imposed in the country. This development deeply disturbed the people of East Pakistan who felt that their dream of a democratic Pakistan had gone soured. Within a few weeks, Ayub Khan kicked out Sikandar Mirza and assumed absolute power as self-proclaimed president of the country. At that point in time, many stalwarts of politics had either died or lost their political leverage. Husain Shaheed Suhrwardi was the only political leader who enjoyed unquestioned popularity in East Pakistan and could rally political forces in West Pakistan as well. Ayub Khan considered him an obvious threat. Therefore he passed an Elected Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in August 1959. 99 politicians were arraigned; out of whom, seventy sought voluntary retirement from politics. Six were acquitted and 22 were disqualified for six years. Suhrwardi was among the disqualified. However Ayub was not satisfied, he feared that Suhrwardi would oppose his forthcoming hand-made constitution. Therefore, Suhrwardi was arrested at the age of 70 in January 1962 and kept in solitary confinement for nearly 7 months. When released in August, Suhrwardi was so disheartened that he went abroad and died in a Beirut Hotel in December 1963 under mysterious circumstances.
In 1962, the federal capital of the country was moved from the coastal city of Karachi to the Northern Punjab in the proximity of military General Head Quarters. The new city of Islamabad further increased the physical and political distance from the seat of power. Additionally, the climatic conditions in North Punjab didn’t suit the people from East Pakistan.
By this time, veteran politicians from East Pakistan were dying in quick succession. A.K. Fazlul Huq died in April 1962. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan died on 19 August 1963. Suhrwardi died in December 1963. Khwaja Nazimuddin died in October 1964. It paved the path for more radical leadership to emerge; foremost among them was Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rahman.
1962 constitution stipulated presidential elections in 1965. Fatima Jinnah decided to contest. Contrary to the expectations of Ayub Khan, Fatima Jinnah garnered 47 percent electoral votes in East Pakistan and in Dhaka, she won hands down. Extensive use of administration, high-handedness and outright rigging ensured Ayub Khan’s victory but he could get 62 percent votes. Mujibur Rahman, along with democratic forces from both parts of the country, stood bravely with Fatima Jinnah.
The loss of face in electioneering prompted Ayub Khan to launch an adventure in Kashmir. However his planning and strategy went astray. Pakistan military Doctrine stipulated that the East Pakistan would be defended in West Pakistan. Hence, the military presence in East Pakistan was nominal and generated a sense of insecurity in East Pakistan. Sound on paper, this specious doctrine failed to satisfy the people of East Pakistan who knew that had India decided to attack on Eastern front, there was little to defend them. Political deprivation, economic disparity, administrative negligence and abject poverty fuelled public fury. Immediately after Tashkent agreement, Mujibur Rehman brought forth his six points on Feb 5, 1966. His Stance won him instant acceptance in his home province as well as considerable international recognition. The Six Point Program polarized both parts of the country at grassroots level. While he was dubbed as a traitor in West Pakistan, he began to epitomize the political aspirations of the masses in East Pakistan. In 1968, Ayub Government arrested 35 persons along with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in Agartala Conspiracy case. The proceedings of the case skyrocketed Sheikh Mujib’s popularity to a point where he was increasingly irresistible. Some of the accused of the Agartala conspiracy case, later, publicly declared that the Agartala conspiracy charges were all true. Indeed, some elements of Awami League had visited Agartala to seek Indian support for independence. Meanwhile, Ayub Government was facing public protest. Under huge pressure Ayub Government released sheikh Mujibur Rehman and brought him to West Pakistan to participate in a round table conference. It was too late. Gen Yahya Khan had decided to be the next man on the horse. Ayub Khan resigned on 25 March 1969, abrogated his own constitution and handed over the power to Army Chief Gen Yahya Khan. New military government dissolved one unit and announced General Elections in Oct 1970 on the basis of one man one vote. East Pakistan was struck by cyclone Bhola in July 1970 which resulted in nearly one million deaths. The colossal loss of life and property delayed the general elections scheduled for October 5th to December 7, 1970. The poor management of natural disaster further boosted the popularity of Awami League.
Contrary to the popular impression, Yahya government was neither fair-handed in election process nor intended to transfer the power after the elections. In order to weaken two popular political parties; Awami league and Pakistan Peoples’ Party, money was distributed. The government openly supported right wing Islamist parties. Legal framework order was couched in a language which ultimately and ensured the continuity of the Yahya khan as the president. While political parties were given 120 days to draft and promulgate the constitution, government was surreptitiously working on a constitutional draft, meant to be promulgated after the failure of elected political leadership to reach a constitutional agreement.
General elections were held in Pakistan on 7 December 1970 to elect members of the National Assembly. Among a total of 300 general constituencies, 162 were in East Pakistan and 138 in West Pakistan. A further thirteen seats were reserved for women. The elections were a fierce contest between two social democrat parties, the West-based Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and the East-based Awami League. Awami League was the most popular party in East Pakistan, while the PPP faced severe competition from several conservative parties which enjoyed government support. The result was a landslide victory for the Awami League, which gained an absolute majority, winning 160 of the 162 general seats and all seven women’s seats in East Pakistan. The PPP won 81 general seats and five women’s seats, all in West Pakistan.
Hamood ur Rehman Commission confirms that Lieutenant-General Yakub Khan conceived a security plan, codenamed, Operation Blitz, well before 1970 general election. Within days after the election, the plan was operationalized. It authorized “the military commander in East Pakistan to take over the total civil administration and restore the state writ with complete freedom in the exercise of his authority”. The ultimate objective was not to hand over power to the elected representatives. The political negotiations in March 1971 – up to March 25 – were just a camouflage to hoodwink political players.
Once the insurgency broke out, the army had to switch over to Operation Searchlight under Lt. General Tikka Khan. As Lt. General Yakub understood the limits of the force in resolving political disputes, he had resigned on March 3, 1971.
Meanwhile, two Kashmiri men high jacked an Indian plane Ganga on 30 January 1971 and forcibly brought it to Lahore. They released the passengers and blew up the plane. This was not a genuine act on the part of Kashmiri freedom fighters. As things transpired, it was a well-planned operation of Indian government to block airspace between two wings of Pakistan. The detour through Sri Lankan space not only was more time consuming but also very costly. It effectively paralyzed whatever semblance of a supply line existed between two parts of the country.
As Yahya regime announced to postpone the session of the newly elected National Assembly on March 3, 1971, riots broke out in all parts of the East Pakistan. The civil administration came to a halt and military writ was largely confined to cantonment areas. Awami League controlled large tracts of territory. Civil officialdom openly defied state writ and Mukti Bahini started operating with near impunity.
After the negotiations between Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto failed, army started Operation Searchlight on March 25th, 1971. A military operation is bound to result in excesses on both sides. However, reckless statements by Pak commanders did more harm than actual excesses. At a meeting on 22 February 1971, the Pakistani President General Yahya Khan is recorded as saying in fury: “Kill three million of them, and the rest will eat out of our hands.” This figure of 3 million stuck in popular memory. According to AAK Niazi, Tikka Khan said, “I want land and not the people”. In an offhand interlocution with a foreign correspondent, Tikka Khan accepted 30000 deaths. Rao Farman’s diary records, “The green of Bengal will be painted red”. However, careful observers have placed casualties at around 300,000. Hamood ur Rahman Commission claimed the figure was 26,000 civilian casualties. About rape, the figures are more difficult to ascertain but Gen. Nizai’s inaugural briefing, documented by Maj. Gen. Khadim Hussain Raja is the ultimate evidence. East Pakistan Commander said “I am here to change their race”. This statement alone obfuscates all debate by Sarmila Bose and Yasmin Saikia in their respective studies of rape as a war weapon in 1971 conflict. The case of non-Bengali population, especially Bihari community is another complicated and blood-stained saga. The expulsion of all foreign press from East Pakistan also didn’t help Pakistan’s cause, who went on to fabricate incorrect and mostly anti-Pakistan stories while sitting in Calcutta.
In 1971, Archer Blood was the U.S. consul general in Dhaka, East Pakistan. The staff at the U.S. consulate in Dhaka were “horrified” by the violence after March 25th and asked Washington, D.C. to intervene. Blood later described the response from Washington as “deafening” silence. Then Blood and his staff created a dissent cable known as the Blood telegram. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not intervene because they were trying to use Pakistan to open diplomatic relations with China.
Bengali population, especially Hindu community was forced to flee the country and seek refuge in India. Later, Indian government justified her military ingress in East Pakistan by citing the humanitarian crisis created by as many as 10 million Bengali refugees. In view of the Indian economic situation in 1971, refugees were a burden but India gained on two fronts: First, India was able to train thousands of able-bodied Bengalis for guerilla warfare who ultimately softened Pakistan army during months leading to war and also during the actual combat. Two: India was able to place a cogent case before the international community.
In the winter of 1971, the Pakistan military in East Pakistan was hardly up to resist a three-pronged Indian attack from India. Apart from overwhelming numerical superiority, Indian army enjoyed multifarious advantages. They were better equipped and their weapons outnumbered those of Pakistan army by some distance. India troops were fresh as against demoralized Pak personnel who were suffering from the fatigue / wear & tear of 9 month long insurgency. Bengali population had turned against Pakistan army to the last man. Pakistan troops knew neither the local language nor the topography. Even the geographic conditions of alluvial Bengal were alien to Pakistan soldiers from dry plains of Punjab. Above all, Pakistan army had no hope of reinforcement, no reserves or even a supply line. Pakistan air force has been rendered dysfunctional within hours of the war as their only air strip was bombed out of war. East Pakistan faced a complete naval blockade. Land forces were spread all along the frontiers to stave off ingress through isolated engagements with Mukti Bahini and hardly had a plan to attack or defend when the war began. Bengali troops, paramilitary forces and East Pakistan Rifles had all revolted and the remaining Bengali military personnel could not be relied upon. It was such a bleak military scenario, which even a Marshal Rommel or Marshal Zukhov would have found hopeless. Lt. Gen. Niazi was not the commander for such an asymmetrical military situation. Pakistani soldiers fought as best as they could but bad planning, poor command and overwhelming magnitude of the enemy forces with blitz technique were too formidable. Within less than a week, Eastern front was collapsing and dismal news pouring from the Western front of the war didn’t help. 90,000 POWs were the largest surrender since WWII. Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force, and nearly one-third of its army.
The Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in August 1971 and resulted in three time veto by USSR during the 13 days war. America was soft on Pakistan but refused to render any substantive support. USA did not want to lose her influence in the region. China was supportive of Pakistan but continued to stress for a political solution to the problem. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and some gulf countries did extend air force support but mainly in West Pakistan. In fact, the world community’s support was genuine only to the point of saving West Pakistan from complete disintegration. Pakistan leadership had lost her case for East Pakistan as early as the beginning of hostilities in the early months of 1971.
India had grabbed the opportunity to truncate Pakistan and the final blows were delivered by the Indian army. However, India was hugely helped by the inept military and political leadership of Pakistan. India was able to eliminate the possibility of a two-front war in future. Pakistan lost more than half of her population and 148,460 square km of territory on her eastern part. Pakistan was directly connected with Far East Asia through East Pakistan but lost her indo-Bengali identity and was restricted to Central Asian and Gulf ties as a result of the war. Apart from severe blow to her dignity as a nation, Pakistan was also denied some of her most important economic assets. East-West polarization in Pakistan was essentially a political question which morphed into the billowing smoke of military mistakes.
In his book The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier’s Narrative, Pakistan Army’s Major General Hakeem Arshad Qureshi noted:
“We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and irresponsible behavior. It was our collective ‘conduct’ that had provided the enemy an opportunity to dismember us.”
- Fall of Dhaka - 11/06/2023
